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 S The Virginia Magazine
 OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY
 t VOL. 8I January 973 NO. I
 RAILROADS AND URBAN RIVALRIES
 IN ANTEBELLUM EASTERN VIRGINIA
 by PETER C. STEWART '
 THE recent controversy between Richmond and Norfolk over deepening
 the James indicates that urban rivalry in the state of Virginia is far from
 dead. Such contests with roots extending far into Virginia's past reached
 a peak in the three decades before the Civil War. Every major community
 in the Old Dominion took part, but the most serious rivalry involved a three-
 cornered struggle among Richmond, Norfolk, and Petersburg.
 At the outset of the railroad era, eastern Virginia's chief commercial
 centers in population, resources, and wealth were Richmond, Norfolk (in-
 cluding neighboring Portsmouth), and Petersburg in that order. The state
 capital had edged ahead of the other two communities in the decade preced-
 ing the War of I 8I 2. The war actually helped Richmond's growth and by
 I820 its inhabitants numbered over i 2,000. Ten years later the population
 had increased by twenty-five percent and the city on the James endowed with
 several flour mills, iron foundries, and tobacco manufactories enhanced its
 lead. The upper James River and its canal brought the produce of the
 interior to her wharves, while coastwise and ocean-going ships, although
 with difficulty, ascended the lower James to bear away Richmond's com-
 merce. Norfolk on the Elizabeth River near the entrance to Chesapeake
 Bay lacked the resources necessary for manufacturing but did possess one
 of the finest harbors in the world. The onetime leading commercial town
 of the state stagnated particularly during the second war with Great Britain
 and the depressing twenties. Petersburg, located on the shallow Appomattox
 River, obviously did not have the advantage of a commodious harbor, but
 $ Dr. Stewart is an associate professor of history at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.
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 4 The Virginia Magazine
 the town did contain a number of cotton textile mills, a few flour mills, and
 several tobacco concerns. Industrial development, on the whole, however,
 lagged behind that enjoyed in Richmond. Petersburg's inhabitants made
 up for their poor location by making maximum use of their resources. Thus
 her residents proved more than a match for Norfolk in the fight for second
 place in economic development.
 These three communities all participated in building the first major rail-
 roads in the state. Each railroad when projected was expected to promote
 the economic growth of its sponsoring community or at least to defend it
 against the incursions of another. Such objectives were bound to produce
 intense rivalry.
 The most bitter of these "wars" pitted the port of Norfolk against
 the manufacturing center of Petersburg. Toward the end of the War of
 I812 Norfolk merchants and North Carolina farmers happily witnessed
 the completion of the Dismal Swamp Canal, which permitted lighters
 and other small craft to bring the Old North State's lumber and agricultural
 products to the Elizabeth River. Narrow and shallow, the canal posed no
 threat to Petersburg, recently rebuilt after a disastrous fire and entering an
 era of significant growth as a textile and tobacco-processing center. Un-
 fortunately for relations between the two towns, the businessmen of Norfolk,
 noting that they controlled only a small fraction of the total commerce of
 their own state, tried to secure the tobacco and grain produced in consider-
 able volume in the Roanoke Valley. This was possible because the Roanoke
 River flows into Albemarle Sound, the southern terminus of the Dismal
 Swamp Canal. Tobacco and grain from Southside Virginia, as well as
 cotton from North Carolina, could, therefore, be carried by water all the
 way to Norfolk. In December i 81 5 several men in an open boat carried a
 barrel of mountain flour from Campbell County in Southside Virginia to
 Norfolk. This act gave "pleasing evidence of the facilities which exist
 towards opening a communication with the interior of the state through the
 fertile parts of North Carolina."' However, several rapids in the Roanoke
 River had to be eliminated if Norfolk was to secure a steady flow of goods
 from the interior. Shortly after the voyage of the men from Campbell,
 Norfolk merchants helped organize the Roanoke Navigation Company,
 which gradually cleared the river for trade. Aware that the volume of com-
 merce was bound to increase and that Roanoke River towns would be
 employing larger vessels, the officers of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company
 INorfolk American Beacon, December 14, 1815.
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 Railroads and Urban Rivalries 5
 immediately made plans to rebuild their waterway. By I830 both projects
 had been completed. Norfolk, it appeared, had obtained commercial su-
 premacy in the Roanoke Valley.
 The farmers in the Valley did not feel endangered by this development
 at all for the appearance of the canal was to their advantage. One Valley
 newspaper, the Roanoke Advocate, suggested in I830 that planters in the
 upper Valley stop wagoning their tobacco to Petersburg and send their
 cargoes to Norfolk. The editor pointed out that farmers formerly took all
 winter to ship their crops, but this was no longer necessary. The editor
 suggested that Valley folk could expect even further improvements, for
 Petersburg would awake quickly "from her dreams of security. . . . Norfolk
 and Petersburg will then be fairly in competition, and our friends may find
 good and ready markets, and take their choice."2
 Petersburg residents had no intention of allowing Norfolk to take the
 commerce of the Roanoke Valley. It had long been "customary to view the
 upper towns as the jealous rivals of Norfolk and enemies of her prosperity,"3
 and the attempted capture of the Roanoke commerce brought quick retalia-
 tion. In I 830 the General Assembly over the objection of Norfolk's delega-
 tion chartered the Petersburg Railroad Company. Within three years the
 railroad south of Petersburg reached the Roanoke River at Weldon, North
 Carolina.
 With the trade of the upper Roanoke about to shift back to Petersburg,
 the residents of Norfolk decided to build their own railroad. Some Norfolk
 merchants promoted the Tarborough Railroad, designed to connect the
 Tar and Roanoke Rivers, thereby increasing trade, particularly along the
 latter river. The Tarborough project, however, failed to obtain sufficient
 subscriptions. Most investors purchased stock in the Portsmouth and
 Roanoke Railroad Company which planned to reach Weldon, North Caro-
 lina. The road, claimed Thomas G. Broughton, Jr., the editor of the Herald,
 "would bid defiance to competition and insure us command of the entire
 produce of the upper Roanoke."4 Despite the importance of the project,
 stock sales were slow. Norfolk sought a variance in the usual method of
 distributing aid whereby the state bought forty percent of the shares only
 after private interests pledged the other sixty percent. The Senate refused
 to allow any change in the procedure, which led the editor to comment
 that the Richmond and Petersburg interests proved too strong for Norfolk:
 2 Norfolk Herald, September i 3, 1830.
 Ibid., June 27, 1829.
 4Ibid., April 30, I832.
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 We did flatter ourselves with the hope that the bill would pass, for we were anxious
 to have to say that Norfolk was indebted to the Legislature for one . . . even one act
 of liberality and justice, but we have been disappointed.... but you cannot prevent
 it-completed it will be, in spite of you-a revolution has taken place in the minds of
 the people of this district in favor of the railroad, and revolutions never go backward.5
 The Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad faced nearly insurmountable
 obstacles. Begun in I832 in the midst of a cholera epidemic, it was com-
 pleted in I837 in a time of nationwide financial panic. The depression
 which followed kept receipts from transportation quite low. Although the
 route to Weldon was properly surveyed, shoddy construction resulted in
 high maintenance costs. Still, the venture might have survived except for a
 direct confrontation with the Petersburg Railroad.
 Financial statements of the two companies indicated that the Petersburg
 firm was far better equipped to withstand a prolonged fight. In spite of its
 shorter length, the interior road collected much more in tolls. Completed
 about three years before the Portsmouth road, it had been able to establish
 a firm foundation before the rivalry commenced. Still, the other road con-
 ceivably could catch up. After the first full year of business the Portsmouth
 railroad trailed its opponent by only $25,000 in receipts. For the remainder
 of the decade the seaboard line did well, increasing its receipts from
 nearly $49,8oo to $59,140 in 1839 and finally to almost $73,000 a year
 later. Petersburg, however, did even better. Figures for i 840 are unavail-
 able but in 1839 the piedmont road eamed about $130,800, well over
 twice the receipts of her rival. Up to this point competition had not injured
 either party and the future looked bright for both despite the prevailing de-
 pression.6
 One significant factor giving Petersburg a long range advantage was her
 ability to control freight traffic. The originators of the Portsmouth road
 had hoped to divert the flow of tobacco and other crops to the coast. This
 goal could never be fully realized, partially because Petersburg herself con-
 sumed an increasing quantity of produce in her mills and also because Rich-
 mond used even more. As Henry Bird, president of the Petersburg line,
 viewed the situation it was "very evident that the Portsmouth Company can-
 not be benefitted by the competition-nor indeed the towns of Norfolk
 and Portsmouth for the tobacco is to go to Richmond."' Bird's opinion
 r Norfolk Herald, March 1, 1833.
 6 'Tolls Received," Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad Company, "Statements," Petersburg
 Railroad Company, Board of Public Works, MSS., Virginia State Archives, Richmond, hereafter
 cited as BPW.
 7 Letter, Bird to J. Brown, June x 8, x 842, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
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 Railroads and Urban Rivalries 7
 is borne out by the fact his railroad, unlike most roads at that time, derived
 income largely from freight-as high as sixty-five percent of all revenue in
 I838, compared with less than thirty percent for the opposition.8 Bird
 cemented control over freight in the late i 83os by constructing a branch line
 westward which tapped the commerce of the Roanoke before it reached
 Weldon. Survival of the Portsmouth railroad in the depression-ridden
 i840s, therefore, depended on persuading more travelers to use their facility.
 Portsmouth officials realized that bridging the Roanoke River at Weldon
 wvould give their railroad an edge on the Petersburg line. The management
 of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, chartered just three years before
 in North Carolina, preferred not to cross the Roanoke to connect with an-
 other railroad. When the Weldon Bridge was completed, the seaboard mer-
 chants appeared to have out maneuvered their rivals. Bird complained
 bitterly and tried, with the help of the Virginia Board of Public Works, to
 rent use of the bridge. Negotiations failed. The Petersburg Company then
 formed an alliance with two other Virginia railroads-the Richmond and
 Petersburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac. The three
 companies, commonly called the "inland" route, cut fares in half, hoping to
 drive the Portsmouth Road out of business. The latter retaliated, reducing
 fares and arranging for special through rates to Baltimore with the newly
 created Baltimore and Norfolk Steam Packet Company (the Bay Line).
 The rate war inflicted severe damage on the Petersburg Road. Bird com-
 plained to the state auditor in September I 842 that he could pay no dividend
 to the state on its share of the stock because of the severity of the competition.
 I must inform you that the efforts of the Portsmouth Company to divert our trade
 from us continue as active as -ever. We no sooner lowered our rates of transportation
 last summer than they reduced theirs below ours, and it is probable we shall have to
 lower again.9
 The special through ticket also tended to reduce revenue for the Petersburg
 line. Bird estimated that the special arrangement gave his company $I.37
 less per passenger than the local rate and meant that he suffered an annual
 loss of between $I2,000 and $I 5,000.10
 Although the rate war cut income for the inland road, the reduction was
 even more severe for her rival. The seaboard line managed to hold her own
 fairly well until the through ticket took effect in December I 842. Revenue
 8 'Tolls Received," and "Statements" of the respective companies, BPW.
 9 Letter, Bird to Brown, September x6, 1842, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
 IO Petersburg Intelligencer, March I 6, I 845.
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 then slid approximately twenty-five percent as the piedmont road steadily
 gained the upper hand. The cost of construction of the bridge at Weldon
 also severely jeopardized the Portsmouth Company's finances leaving the
 company heavily in debt to some unsympathetic individuals. In I843
 Francis Rives, secretly representing the Petersburg Company, acquired one
 of these claims and immediately acted to close the road. Petersburg officials
 even sent some of their workers to help tear up the Portsmouth tracks. Upon
 learning of these events, Walter Gwynn, president of the Portsmouth con-
 cern, led another force to stop further assaults and repair the damage already
 done. Following a comic chase scene and a bloodless encounter, the sheriff
 of Northampton County, North Carolina, arrested Rives. Petersburg offi-
 cials, of course, were annoyed, but saw eventual victory. The Petersburg
 Intelligencer on March i6 predicted
 that, as our state is a part owner in this concem, she will have too much regard for her
 credit to remain much longer in a concern which will neither pay its debts, or sur-
 render property for the payment of them, when she sees her liabilities are increasing.
 We hesitate not to say that there is a moral obligation on the State either to have
 business suspended or property sold.
 The editor of the Herald responded that the comments from the Intelli-
 gencer were
 well calculated to make false irnpressions.... The piece is marked by the same
 cunning and concealment which have heretofore characterized the course of certain
 individuals and corporations towards the Portsmouth Road. The article in the Intel-
 ligencer is but another small link in the chain of circumstances which goes to establish
 the fact.11
 The whcle Rives business was "openly denounced as a gunpowder plot."12
 Despite the seriousness of the situation, the editorial ended on a rather defi-
 ant note. "In the meantime the Portsmouth Road will continue its opera-
 tion."13 Anxiously awaiting news of Rives' trial in North Carolina, the
 Herald prematurely reported that decisions in the lower courts against Rives
 had been affirmed by the supreme court of the state, thwarting the "dia-
 bolical efforts of the Petersburg Company to break down its hated rival."'4
 One can scarcely imagine the consternation in Hampton Roads when the
 residents discovered that the North Carolina Supreme Court actually gave
 " Norfolk Herald, March 1, 1845.
 12 Ibid.
 s Ibid.
 14 Ibid., March 22, I845.
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 Rives control in the Old North State. Rives quiclly moved to stop all traffic
 on the North Carolina portion of the Portsmouth Road.
 Prominent Norfolkians tried to persuade the Virginia Board of Public
 Works to do something to save the road. Walter Gwynn hoped the Board of
 Public Works would assist against Rives. The state, he noted, helped build
 the road and he professed disbelief that "she can now be influenced to de-
 stroy it by the cold and selfish principle of dividend paying. "'5 One Norfolk
 businessman, writing a few months after the Rives affair, argued:
 If Virginia gives up her Norfolk Railroad, . . . she relinquished to Baltimore her only
 seaport and all her foreign commerce hereafter. Like North Carolina she will become
 content, or will perforce be compelled, to become tributary to other states whilst by
 fostering her seaport she would remain independent of all other markets for her foreign
 and domestic imports and exports.16
 Despite such pleading, the Board of Public Works and the General Assem-
 bly, though sympathetic, remained aloof.
 In at least one respect the state legislature of North Carolina was friend-
 lier. When Francis Rives petitioned that body for a charter to incorporate a
 line from Weldon to Virginia, the North Carolinians noted that Rives had
 an agreement with Petersburg by which he received payment to keep the
 line inactive. Obviously Rives was interested in obtaining a charter to pre-
 vent anyone else from starting another road to Portsmouth. A Virginia legis-
 lative committee hearing brought out the fact that Rives was to receive
 $2,500 quarterly as long as his road carried no person or produce.'7 Several
 years later a new company rebuilt the railway and once again the seaboard
 enjoyed decent transportation with the Roanoke. Ironically one of the fac-
 tors in the reappearance of this road was another urban rivalry-this one
 involving Richmond and Petersburg.
 The contest between these two fall-line towns though less motivated by
 community pride was at times as vicious as the one between Norfolk and
 Petersburg. The animosity reached a peak in I846 after the Portsmouth
 road had apparently been interred. As early as April internal improvement
 15 Twelfth Annual Report . . . of the Portsmouth and Roanoke Company (Portsmouth,
 1844), p. 43.
 6George Blow to BPW, June x, I846, Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad Company, BPW.
 17 "Record of Proceedings and Evidence Taken and Had before the Joint Committee Charged
 with the Investigation of the Conduct of Certain Railroad Companies, &c.," Journal of the House
 of Delegates of Virginia, Session 1846-47 (Richmond, 1846), pp. 89-92; North Carolina,
 Legislative Documents (I846-47), PP. 4-5.
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 advocates suggested the construction of a ship channel from Petersburg to
 the Appomattox River near the James.18
 We have manufactures here which can and, if we only had the commercial advantages,
 would compete with those of any city in the Union. We have a real extensive and
 miagnificent back country ready to pour into our laps the abundant treasures of its
 labor and its thrift, if we but afford the opportunity of the retum, of a recompensing
 gain. Give us but the nucleus here-the means of an untrammeled and frequent inter-
 course with the high seas and we can force the hidden treasures of unnumbered acres
 and the "freighted tides" of distant waters to minister to our wealth and strength.19
 Petersburg, one editor advised, should not be angry with Richmond but
 should emulate her.
 Richmond proposes to the country, not the country to Richmond. There is a public
 spirit, an enterprise, a strengthening and a laudable desire for gain there. Argus-eyed,
 active and ever prompt to make the very best of any and all projects to multiply the
 wealth and resources of the city. So it should be with Petersburg and so it will be if
 we are not mistaken.20
 In spite of these efforts to keep local jealousy at a minimum, anti-Rich-
 mond sentiment began to creep into the canal campaign. One correspondent
 noted that the real idea behind the project had become "to turn back the
 trade that has found its way to Richmond or take away that which time im-
 memorially she had enjoyed."'2' Petersburg, he submitted, wished to kill
 Richmond's ports on the James-Port Walthall and Bermuda Hundred-
 and capture the valley trade as well as the southern traffic. The truth was
 that many residents of the Cockade City, distressed by Richmond's growth,
 were concerned over talk of a railroad connecting the capital with Danville,
 and were irritated that much of the commerce coming over their railroad
 ended up in Richmond. After a vigorously supported beginning, the idea
 of a ship canal fell by the wayside and Petersburgers refocused attention on
 their railroads.
 The "inner route" alliance had been uneasy at best. Even before it had
 been arranged, Bird complained about being caught between "the Ports-
 moutli Company on the one hand and those who ought to be our friends
 (the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company) on the other." He bragged
 that once he paid for some iron to rebuild his facility he could "face them
 '8Petersburg Republican, April I3, I 846.
 19 Ibid., July I o, I 846.
 20 Ibid.
 21 Ibid., July 17, 1846.
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 both."22 When the Portsmouth road closed a few years later, Bird quickly
 terminated his arrangement with the other two lines. He then made a deal
 with James River steamboat interests to take passengers to Hampton Roads,
 there to board Bay steamers going to Baltimore. At the same time Petersburg
 started to revamp the publicly owned City Point Railroad so that passengers
 would have quick passage to the James River.
 Moncure and Wirt Robinson, presidents of the other two lines, responded
 by building a branch line from the tracks of the Richmond and Petersburg
 to Port Walthall located just north of City Point on the James. The two
 "upper" route railways then organized a steamboat company known as the
 Norfolk and Port Walthall Association. According to testimony later given
 before a special legislative committee, the railroads not only gave the steam-
 boats a certain amount of money based on the passenger traffic on the rail-
 roads, but even helped in financing the construction of the steamboats them-
 selves though the company charters forbade stock purchases in other cor-
 porations. Both presidents defended their actions on the grounds that it was
 "an important protection to the companies north of Petersburg against the
 injury with which they have been threatened."23 The editor of the Peters-
 burg Intelligencer, J. W. Syme, was not particularly receptive to the attempt
 to make Port Walthall a major riverport.
 The proprietors of this famous new line which is to connect the "hole" where "cats"
 "most do congregate"-but which is now sonorously called "Port Walthall"-with
 the City of Norfolk, state in the outset that their object is "to expedite travel as much as
 possible between Petersburg and Richmond and Norfolk," and therefore they will
 not stop for way travel. Why, what a benevolent and disinterested concern this new
 one is! They don't care to make money! Not they. As a member of the legislature
 once said, they are "above the filthy lucre of the gain." They would not pollute their
 pure hands with the "dirty dross." They go entirely for the good of the public, and
 their association should be called "The Cat Hole Pro Bono Publico Steamboat Line."24
 Syme correctly pointed out that the northern roads were perfectly willing
 to lose money on the Port Walthall proposition as long as the Petersburg
 people could be driven from the James River. Noting that Moncure Robin-
 son was well known as the originator of "the new way of bringing business
 to his road by drawing business from it," the Petersburg editor foresaw
 22Ltter, Bird to J. Brown, September io, 1842, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
 23Board of Public Works, Annual Report (1846), P. 448.
 24Editorial, Petersburg Intelligencer, April i I, I846, as quoted in "Record of Proceedings and
 Evidence Taken and Had before the Joint Committee Charged with the Investigation of the
 Conduct of Certain Railroad Companies," Journal of House of Delegates (I846), P. 38.
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 defeat for the scheme. "He can as easily dam up the river as prevent boats
 from running on it,"25 Syme declared.
 Stubbornness and personal dislike governed the actions of both Bird and
 Robinson. In private Robinson called Bird "one of those stupid fellows"26
 and the latter complained about Robinson's "bullying spirit."27 Robinson
 thought Bird's "shortsighted policy" would diminish company receipts
 below what they had been when the Portsmouth road was still operating.28
 Progress of the Danville-Richmond road and talk of revival of the Ports-
 mouth Railroad, Robinson figured, endangered Petersburg's situation.29 The
 possibility that Bird might join with Wilmington's railroad in a huge
 through ticket from Charleston to Baltimore did not alarm Robinson for he
 considered Bird too foolish to take advantage of such a scheme and because
 he thought his own railway relied more on local traffic.30 He did fear "a
 design in Petersburg . . . to throw the line [the Richmond and Petersburg]
 into confusion."3" The leader of the "upper route" had to be on his toes to
 keep the state government at least neutral in the fight and there was un-
 doubtedly either pressure or money applied in the right places to prevent the
 state from interceding. Both sides aired their views in the legislative halls
 as part of an investigation of the Port Walthall association at the request of
 Robert Mayo, the operator of the James River steamboat line allied with
 Bird's railroad.32
 While the controversy between Bird and Robinson raged, Petersburgers
 sought to add another arrow to their quiver. Syme, aware that a loose alli-
 ance between Richmond and Lynchburg was coming apart, called for the
 construction of a new railroad joining the latter town with Petersburg.
 Lynchburg had benefitted to some extent from its location on the James
 River, but its citizens realized that the far western trade offered a bright
 future. In the fall of I847 the town's residents backed the idea of a road
 called the "Richmond and Ohio," which would meet the James River at
 Lynchburg. Delegates from Lynchburg and several western counties meet-
 ing at Wytheville also urged a branch road through southwestern Virginia
 25 Editorial, June 23, 1846, Petersburg, Intelligencer, p. 39.
 26Letter, Moncure Robinson to Edwin Robinson, July I, I847, Moncure Robinson Papers,
 College of William and Mary Library.
 27Letter, Bird to Brown, April 7, 1847, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
 28 Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, June 21, 1847, Robinson Papers.
 29 Ibid., August 3', 1847.
 so Ibid., February 8, I848.
 31 Ibid., January 9, I 848.
 32 "Record of Proceedings and Evidence Taken and Had before the ... Joint Committee . .
 Journal of House of Delegates ( 846).
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:03:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Railroads and Urban Rivalries I 3
 to the Tennessee border. A minority at this convention wanted to extend tie
 Danville Road, but a strong Lynchburg delegation defeated this effort. As
 Lynchburg argued with both Richmond and Danville, Syme advanced his
 thought that Petersburg should erect a line to a point 40 miles to the west-
 there joining two other roads coming from Danville and Lynchburg. The
 Lynchburg Virginian stated that Syme's proposal "seems to have caused
 some fluttering in Richmond. It is a subject of some interest to us."33 This
 proposal had no direct bearing on the outcome of the dispute between the
 north-south railroads, but in the next decade Petersburg was able to take ad-
 vantage of her location for east-west traffic to wrest commerce away from the
 capital.
 In the struggle over the north-south traffic the "Bay Company" proved to
 be the key to victory. After the failure of the Portsmouth road, the steam-
 boat company turned to the James River boats for travelers. In the spring of
 I 847 Robinson considered preventing an alliance between the Bay line and
 the Petersburg Railroad Company one of his major policies.34 A year later,
 with the City Point Railroad rebuilt, which greatly strengthened Bird's
 hand, Robinson feared the Petersburg organization might somehow take
 prospective "upper route" passengers. In the event this occurred Robinson
 threatened to put "a line of boats in the Bay in connection with the revised
 Portsmouth Road."35 In other words the principal owner of the R. F. & P.
 was willing to sacrifice his own traffic to destroy Bird's. Actually Bird never
 did cement an alliance with the Bay line. In the summer of I 846 the board
 of the Petersburg Company resolved to "permit no agents either of the Bay
 Company or the Rail Roads north of Petersburg" to have free passes or
 use any company facilities to sell tickets.36 Bird argued that the real culprits
 were the northern Virginia railroads which kept rates high. Lowering rates,
 he suggested, would eliminate competition from the James River boats. By
 providing steamboat service down the James River, both companies increased
 the importance of Chesapeake Bay. In I 847 Bird estimated that over half
 the passengers took the Bay route.37
 In addition to posing a threat as part of an alliance, the Bay line also could
 endanger all Virginia "fall line" railways by working for the revival of the
 Portsmouth road, their old ally. When a projected Charleston to New York
 33Lynchburg Virginian, November 25, 1848.
 34Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, March 31, 1847, Robinson Papers.
 i5Ibid., February 8, 1848.
 86 etter, Bird to Brown, July 7, I846, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
 371bid., August I9, 1847.
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 steamship line panicked North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsyl-
 vania interests into considering through tickets, and Moncure Robinson
 stubbornly refused to work with the Chesapeake Bay line, Bird pointed out
 that only the Bay company was interested in the revival of the Portsmouth
 road. Excluding the Bay people from competing would likely start the Ports-
 mouth Road again.8
 Apparently unknown to Bird, forces were already at work to change the
 thinking of his hated rival. As early as October 1846 Virginia's Governor
 William Smith suggested the possibility of a plan to allow the rebuilding of
 the old Portsmouth Road and at the same time avert the chaos which led to
 its demise. The governor was interested primarily in preventing a repetition
 of the stock failure which he figured cost the state $500,000 directly and
 $I,000,000 indirectly when the original road failed. Smith called for the
 formation of one company including the old railroad and the Bay boats. The
 new company was to be heavily funded by the three inland railroads. This,
 he hoped, would eliminate ruinous competition since the inland roads
 "would have no motive to control the trade or travel to any particular
 route."3 Governor Smith failed to realize that the nature of the rivalry had
 radically changed since the death of the Portsmouth line. His ideas even-
 tually bore fruit but not in the manner he visualized.
 Northern capitalists were the first to take steps to revise the road to
 Hampton Roads. Their motives are suspect. According to a contemporary
 newspaper the whole scheme was preposterous, being devised solely for
 quick resale at a good profit. Actually the "Henshaw" interests who got con-
 trol did considerable work, but they resold with a substantial number of
 shares going to a most unusual party-the Chesapeake Bay Line. Mean-
 while that company had experienced a major upheaval among its stock-
 holders. Moncure Robinson of the R. F. & P. along with several of his
 friends and associates had taken over the Steamboat Company apparently to
 help fight the Petersburg line. The enterprise was too valuable to destroy
 and its annihilation would only permit someone else to start a similar line.
 In its first full year of operation with Robinson as a prominent stockholder,
 the line earned a fourteen percent dividend, which led him to conclude that
 it needed "no other business than that of Norfolk and Portsmouth to sup-
 port it.""O This statement indicates a willingness to withdraw the Bay line
 88 Letter, Bird to Brown, September 23, I847, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
 389Leter, William Smith to John Cocke, October 30, I846, Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad
 Conpany, BPW.
 40 Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, March 24, 1849, Robinson Papers.
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 as an instrument in the fight against Petersburg. In the years following,
 however, Robinson bought into the Seaboard and Roanoke Road. In time he
 came to see the real value of coastal shipping and reduced his connection
 with the Richmond railroads. For a few years he sat on the fence. In re-
 sponse to a request that he stop the creation of a through ticket between
 Petersburg, Norfolk and Baltimore he refused but pointed out that
 myself and my friends in the Bay line are pecuniarily more interested in proportion in
 the Bay line than in the upper route . . . but whilst pecuniarily more interested in
 travel going by the Bay line than the upper route, our feelings (from having first gone
 into the Upper route and that we have other friends exclusively there) are more
 interested in the success of the upper route than the Seaboard and Roanoke railroad
 and Bay line.41
 In i86o Robinson gave further evidence of his switch when he placed one
 of his sons in the Seaboard office in Portsmouth thus indicating a preference
 for the coastal project.
 By the early I 85os Richmond had temporarily outwitted her rivals. Peters-
 burg was forced to send most of her goods and passengers on to Richmond
 while Norfolk's steamboat and railroad interests were under the control of
 Richmond railroad men. But both Petersburg and Norfolk had options left.
 They could aid each other in the fight against Richmond.
 The long standing feud between Norfolk and Richmond started well be-
 fore the introduction of the railroads which sparked ill feeling between Nor-
 folk and Petersburg. Early conflicts between the capital and the coast cen-
 tered on the banking question. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
 the state government authorized the establishment of a branch banking sys-
 tem with a parent bank in Richmond and branches located in other Virginia
 towns. Many years later when Norfolk requested a bank of its own, the
 local editor pointed out that when Norfolk first applied for its own inde-
 pendent bank charter in I803, Richmond "perhaps a little jealous of the
 prosperity of her neighbor" acquired control of the bank.42 In I 812 Norfolk's
 citizens tried once more only to be blocked again. In the mid-i 83os Norfolk
 pressed her claims for an independent institution. Finally in 1837 as part
 of a general banking reform Norfolk obtained the parent bank of a new
 system with branches in Richmond and Petersburg. The people of Norfolk,
 said the editor, owed "a debt of gratitude to the Legislature of I836-37
 which has broken the chain which for more than fifty years has held her
 41Letter (copy), November I 5, I 858, Robinson Papers.
 42 Herald, April 14, 1837.
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 [Norfolk] in commercial bondage and paralized her energies." Broughton,
 noting that Petersburg still did not possess a parent bank said the inland
 town need not worry for Norfolk would not "abuse her trust toward Peters-
 burg as Richmond did to Norfolk."43
 Richmond's failure to support federal allocation to the Dismal Swamp
 Canal Company in the mid i 82os gave Norfolkians reason to criticize the
 capital. Actually the state legislature, which happened to meet there, and
 Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, who spoke for much of
 rural central Virginia, were the culprits. These forces along with part of the
 congressional delegation were on record opposing internal improvements
 at federal expense, which also meant voting against federal funds for Hamp-
 ton Roads.
 The coming of the railroad greatly intensified ill will between Norfolk
 and Richmond. Residents of Norfolk tended to blame Richmond more than
 Petersburg for what happened to the Portsmouth Railroad. When the legis-
 lature refused to change the usual procedure in purchasing stock in internal
 improvement companies, the Norfolk newspaper understood Petersburg's
 opposition, but Richmond's position, it said, "could be stimulated by nothing
 but a deep-rooted jealousy of and hostility to the rise of Norfolk since the
 new railroad could not possibly harm Richmond but might help Norfolk.""
 The Elizabeth River communities, however, were guilty of the same kind
 of opposition. Richmond was vitally interested in the construction of the
 James River Canal which was supposed to tap the far western trade for Vir-
 ginia. While coastal inhabitants did not oppose a charter or state aid for the
 project, they objected to any special considerations. Ritchie tried to con-
 vince seaboarders that the James River project would help develop Norfolk
 as a seaport since all goods flowed through Hampton Roads. He urged Nor-
 folk and Portsmouth not to worry about the "comparatively insignificant
 Roanoke scheme."45 Perhaps because Richmond often exported more to
 foreign ports in the I 83 as than any other community in the state, very few
 flatlanders took Ritchie's suggestion seriously.
 Richmond, of course, participated only indirectly in the wreck of the
 Portsmouth Road but coastal residents tended to blame the state government
 located in Richmond for what happened. There seemed to be a sinister
 "metropolitan influence" at work to block the rise of the port of Norfolk.
 Trivial incidents led to inflammatory statements. On one occasion when a
 43Herald, April 14, I837.
 441bid., March I, 1833.
 4- Quoted in Herald, May I9, 1831.
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 seaboard newspaper editor felt his community had been neglected in a house
 committee report, he urged outright secession from Virginia because the
 "only alternative seemed to be revolution."'46 Another editor over a similarly
 unimportant matter stated that "there is a point beyond which patience
 ceases to be a virtue." If conditions failed to improve, the paper hoped that
 our representatives in that body [the General Assembly] will return home, and our
 people take prompt and decided steps to release themselves from bondage by annexing
 the city, come what may, to North Carolina-who would at least treat us with decent
 and common justice.47
 But in addition to its doubtful legality, secession could not improve Nor-
 folk's situation and the move to withdraw from Virginia failed to carry.
 One of the real problems causing dissension in eastern Virginia was the
 attitude in the capital. Richmond newspapers rarely mentioned the rebel-
 lious views in Hampton Roads. According to this view local rivalry should
 be snuffed out for the welfare of the entire state in the face of Northern
 threats. The real problem was that most Richmonders somehow assumed
 that their city should be the economic hub of the state. It was perfectly
 natural, somehow, that Virginia's biggest port was well over one hundred
 miles inland. They could not understand why Petersburg and Norfolk
 failed to join them in building up the capital's commerce to help defend Vir-
 ginia against the enroachments of Baltimore and New York. As the sec-
 tional conflict grew Richmond came to see itself as the state's first line of
 defense.
 Virginia should have and might have a centre of intellect at her University, a centre of
 Fashion at her mineral springs, and a centre of capital, trade, and manufactures at
 Richmond. . . . It is now a well established theory in political economy that the
 centre of trade robs the extremities, to enrich the country round them. They rob those
 extremities of their labor, their skill, their thoughts, their intellect, their fashions, their
 language, their customs, their national identity and independence as well as of their
 wealth.48
 In making such comments the Richmond editor obviously had Northern
 cities in mind, but he failed to realize that in Virginia, Petersburg and Nor-
 folk would be considered "extremities" if Richmond remained the hub. It
 would have been impossible, however, for such a writer to have been totally
 unaware of the existence of urban jealousies, for just a short time before he
 46Weekly Southern Argus, February i i, IS5 I5.
 47Herald, FebruarY 3, i852..
 48 Richmond Enquirer, (semi-weekly) March 7, I856.
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 published the above statement, Richmond suffered its first major defeat at
 the hands of its two primary antagonists-Norfolk and Petersburg.
 In the decade before the Civil War, Virginia poured millions of dollars
 into an attempt to build up her economic resources. Not only did the James
 River Canal project continue to receive financial support, but the state began
 to purchase as much as sixty percent of the stock in a number of railroads,
 despite the fact that these companies competed with each other and with the
 canal. The Richmond-oriented Virginia Central Railroad with its western
 terminal beyond the Blue Ridge mountains opened not only the Valley of
 Virginia, but potentially via the Covington Railroad, the Ohio Valley as
 well. In the same period the state chartered three railroads which together
 would cross southern Virginia reaching Tennessee's railroads to give Peters-
 burg and Norfolk rail connection with the Mississippi River. Norfolk was
 particularly interested in a railroad to Petersburg, but the whole project also
 depended on the successful construction of the Southside Road from Peters-
 burg to Lynchburg and the completion of the Virginia and Tennessee which
 covered the remaining distance to the state border.
 An internal improvements convention held in Norfolk in I854 demon-
 strates how Richmond's position had deteriorated. The lone Richmond
 delegate James Lyons "defended Richmond from the charge of inhospitable-
 ness and want of liberality." He "appealed to the citizens of Norfolk not to
 take part against the north side."49 He agreed that the southern roads should
 be built, but objected to the unusual gauges used. The Richmond road used
 the standard 4 feet 8? inch gauge, but the southern roads were all wide
 gauge, which exceeded 5 feet. Obviously the difference in gauge hindered
 any effort by Richmond to draw traffic off the southwestern roads. At the
 same time the southern contingent at the convention called for the wide
 gauge for the new Covington Road so that its freight could not be carried
 off to Baltimore. The southern delegation refused to budge except to say
 that the state should aid railroads both north and south of the James equally
 and that the state should broaden the gauge of the Central Railroad to con-
 form to those south of the James. Failing to prevent passage of anti-Rich-
 mond resolutions, two representatives from the capital asked not to be "con-
 sidered . . . in the deliberations of the convention."50 Lyons, who stayed
 despite the resolves, was undoubtedly distressed at the outcome.
 Earlier in the year a Richmond dominated internal improvements conven-
 49Richmond Enquirer, November 14, 1854.
 50 Ibid.
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 tion had been held at White Sulphur Springs. Although some Tidewater
 representatives attended the meeting, no Norfolk delegate appeared. The
 gathering listened to Richard Morris, a Richmonder, complain about the
 attempt to build up Norfolk. "To do this," he said, "other cities of equal
 claims are to be set aside-the interests of other sections of the State dis-
 regarded."'" Seeking to calm troubled waters, Joseph Segar, a coastal dele-
 gate, stressed the value of the Covington route. To disturbed Richmond
 businessmen, he pointed out that certain branch roads which might enable
 Norfolk to share in the trans-mountain commerce, would not really hurt the
 capital. Segar also presented himself as a friend of Norfolk. The southside
 railroads even with branch lines, he predicted would fail to bring ample
 shipments. Heavy freight charges would keep the James River Canal at a
 premium. In addition Petersburg planned to draw the western trade to City
 Point, thus forcing it down the James River anyway. Since Norfolk had far
 superior harbor facilities, she was bound eventually to control a large por-
 tion of the western freight.52
 The capital, though, was not completely cut off from commerce. The Vir-
 ginia Central continued to carry goods produced in the Valley and one day
 in the not too distant future the far greater resources of the Ohio Valley
 might come to the James. Since their own river lacked depth, Richmond
 began to build a railway to Eltham (West Point) to reach deep water on the
 York River. Norfolk tried to check Richmond's advantage in the valley by
 diverting the traffic of the Virginia Central to Petersburg, but little could
 be done about the York River port except to complain and be comforted by
 the knowledge that Eltham was not Richmond.
 The attempt to keep future traffic from Richmond created a considerable
 stir, for Richmonders deeply resented the plan which would have diverted
 an already existing traffic. A Norfolk editor dreamed up an idea of building
 a railroad from Charlottesville to Petersburg thus permitting central Virginia
 produce to come to Norfolk once the Norfolk-Petersburg Railroad was com-
 pleted. A contributor to the Weekly Southern Argus applauded the editor
 saying, "If ever the Covington is built, Norfolk through this line (Peters-
 burg and Charlottesville), will be its eastern terminal."53 Those proposing
 such a road did not ask for state aid because such a request might endanger
 51Proceedings of the Internal Improvements Convention Held at White Sulphur Springs, on
 the 24, 25 and 26 August, x854 . . . (Richmond, I855), p. 3.
 52 Speech of Joseph Segar Esq. of Elizabeth City County on the Covington and Ohio Railroad
 Delivered Before the White Sulphur Springs Convention August z5, 1854, pp. 3-30.
 53 Weekly Southern Argus, January I7, I856.
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 the possibility of obtaining a charter. The optimistic correspondent to the
 paper believed that enough capital would be available once the Covington
 Road had been built.
 Be of good cheer men of Norfolk! The hope so long deferred you will yet realize. The
 West is with us. Western members say, "Well, if we ever expect to have a seaport
 Norfolk is the spot. We must concentrate on Norfolk, Richmond won't do." M
 The proverbial monkey wrench appeared, however, when the state legis-
 lature refused even to charter the Petersburg and Charlottesville line. The
 editor of the Argus was furious.
 Are Senators insane? Have they determined that (as it were) a Mason and Dixon
 line shall be drawn through the State of Virginia, South of Richmond and North of
 Norfolk?-that Norfolk should be kept in perpetual bondage below this line, while
 the privileges of crossing it and tapping the improvements south of it shall be extended
 to Richmond, Alexandria and all places north of it?55
 He strongly suggested that Norfolk and other southern delegates refuse to
 aid any other state projects as long as the "only seaport of Virginia is to be
 plundered by taxation without participation!"56 Once again Norfolk's resi-
 dents considered the prospects of seceding from Virginia and joining North
 Carolina. But by this time another kind of secession was rapidly becoming
 the central question of the age and sectional differences crowded local and
 state issues off the stage.
 There can be little doubt that urban rivalry was an important ingredient
 in the history of Virginia's railroads, but it is quite difficult to isolate such
 controversies from other factors. For example, whenever Petersburg and
 Norfolk banded together the railroad fights took on a sectional hue with the
 James River acting as a dividing line. Also, it is virtually impossible to deter-
 mine where pecuniary motives stop and community pnde begins. Thirst
 for profit undoubtedly prompted investments in many cases. But immedi-
 ate financial reward was not expected from stock in Virginia's roads. News-
 papers stressed stock purchases as a patriotic act. All classes were urged to
 participate. There is much evidence to indicate that community came be-
 fore individual gain. The subscriber lists for the Portsmouth and Roanoke
 Railroad show ownership widely dispersed. In I842 about eighty percent
 of the private stockholders owned ten shares or less, and of the 270 share-
 holders only 26 owned more than 20 shares. The biggest stock purchasers
 64Weekly Southern Argus, January 17, 1856.
 66 Ibid., March Io, I 856.
 56 Ibid.
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 were the state and local governments with the state's share running forty
 percent of the total while the Borough of Norfolk and the Town of Ports-
 mouth as a result of public meetings held 2,000 and 2,500 shares respec-
 tively. The situation was much the same in Petersburg's case. In I832
 with 228 private holders, 39 owned but one share and only a small number
 controlled more than ten. The state held its usual percentage and the Cor-
 poration of Petersburg owned nearly twelve percent. A few years later some
 Philadelphians bought into the company, but they retained only a small
 portion of the total number of shares in private hands. Stock lists of the
 R. F. & P. reveal a similar pattern.57
 Merchants and other businessmen probably used an urban rivalry smoke
 screen to enlarge their operations. Railroad managers especially were known
 to employ such tactics. Robinson knew the value of community pride. In a
 fight to retain a favorable mail contract with the federal government against
 Petersburg's attempt to take it away, the leader of the "upper route" called
 on his brother "to keep the press and people of Richmond as united as possi-
 ble in our behalf.""' As trained engineers these men moved around a good
 deal. Walter Gwynn, onetime president of the Portsmouth line, later
 served in a similar capacity with the James River and Kanawha Canal Com-
 pany. Moncure Robinson started as a civil engineer with the Petersburg
 Company and had investments in many important railroads in the state. He
 lived in Philadelphia when urban rivalry reached a peak. As has been
 pointed out, Robinson switched allegiances just before the Civil War, but
 this move did not change his basic technique for one finds him in i 86o
 cautioning his son to do nothing to irritate the citizens of Portsmouth who
 were doubtlessly a little miffed because their railroad was in the hands of
 their former enemies.59
 What influence did local rivalry have on the economic development of
 the communities concerned? If population growth is the principal barome-
 ter, Richmond won for by i 86o her population excluding her suburbs ex-
 ceeded 37,000 while Petersburg and Norfolk had failed to develop as
 rapidly. The capital more than doubled Norfolk's rate of growth in the
 thirty years after the advent of the railroad. Hampton Roads was saved
 from stagnation largely because of the growth of the federally owned Gos-
 port Shipyard whose expansion allowed Portsmouth to develop rapidly.
 57Stockholder Rerts of the various companies may be found interspersed through each com-
 pany's Board of Publc Works MSS.
 8e Utter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, December 30, 1847, Robinson Papers.
 59 Lette, M. Robinson to John Robinson, FebruarY 3, I 86o Robinson Papers.
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 Petersburg fared a little better than Norfolk, but had been unable to keep
 pace with the James River city.' Since Richmond was already moving
 forward before the coming of the railroads, it may be concluded that the
 presence of these facilities merely accentuated a trend already underway.
 In this period, however, railroads played generally a defensive role. Had
 Richmond, for instance, not built her roads she would have suffered. And if
 Petersburg had failed to make rail connections to the Roanoke, she would
 probably have ceased to exist as a major economic center.
 After the Civil War Norfolk's connection with rail lines west and south
 gave her dominion over a large portion of the nation's cotton commerce.
 The larger ships of the postwar era rarely ascended the James to Richmond
 or even the York to West Point. Richmond, like Petersburg, had to place
 more emphasis on industrial development to maintain her population. But
 long after the war, these urban quarrels, though marked with less bitterness,
 occasionally reappeared. The antebellum rivalries left an enduring legacy.
 60 United States Census, Population of the United States in 186o from the Original Returns
 of the Eighth Census (Washington, 1864), p. 519.
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